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AN ANONYMOUS REAPPRAISAL OF THE REVOLUTION AT GILGIT (1ST NOVEMBER 1947) THROUGH REVIEW OF MAJOR WILLIAM ALEXANDER BROWN’S BOOK “THE GILGIT REBELLION- 1947”
HAVING FOUND A copy of the subject anonymous 'Reappraisal of the Gilgit Revolution, 1947' in the course of a casual rummaging through this scribe’s tidbits file, it is taken verbatim for the information of the readers for a dispassionate ‘evaluation’ in order to help collate facts, test the veracity of various versions contained therein aimed at positing a debate pegged in correct historical perspective. It precisely begins with: ‘William Alexander Brown was born on December 22, 1922, who was enlisted in the army and somewhere in 1942, was short-course-commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant from Officer Cadet Training Unit Bangalore, India. He was immediately transferred to the Frontier Corps of Scouts and Militias where he served in South Waziristan Scouts and became proficient in Pushto.
In early 1943, Brown was posted to Gilgit Agency for a period of three years. During this tenure, he had also served as Assistant Political Agent at Chilas. While in Gilgit Agency, he became fully conversant with Shina language and also fairly picked up Burushaski. In 1946, he was posted to Chitral as Commandant Scouts.
He unwittingly admits that while en route to Chitral in June, consultations on the impending decision of Viceroy Lord Mountbatten to hand back Gilgit Agency to Dogra regime on August 1, 1947, were held and that he was willingly timely posted to Gilgit Scouts in service of Maharaja of Kashmir.
On July 29, 1947, he arrived in Gilgit as Commandant Gilgit Scouts.
From the above, it becomes crystal clear that he was a very trusted intelligence asset of the British thinktanks dealing with their forward policy and was planted for the implementation of their plans. Among the participant military officers of the breathtaking events of the ‘Gilgit Revolution’, Major Mirza Hassan Khan (MC) was the senior-most with Lieutenancy seniority of August 1938, from Indian Military Academy Dehradun.
Quite interestingly, Major Brown treats him as his junior in his book which ipso facto appears to be a twisting of facts. Keeping in view the facts that at this point of time accounts of all the important characters of that turbulent time are available for corroboration and that Major Brown was technically drawing a salary from the coffers of Maharaja Kashmir, it is amply proved that he tried his level best to sabotage the revolution and voids in the true story of this historic happening are filled in by the revelations of this book. Beyond doubt, he will be remembered as the Lawrence of Gilgit-Baltistan – a personality he much eulogized and idealized.
During the upheavals of the Revolution, he was twice arrested by Major Hassan Khan. Of the first arrest he admits by stating “The latter persuaded the gullible Babar to send the note I was now reading. Limbuwala logged a message to Peshawar Major Brown had been put under arrest and the situation was very sad.” He has very articulately manifested his second arrest and deportation. However, Brown was successful in sidetracking the revolution by giving a false impression to the Government of Pakistan. After his deportation from Gilgit in January 1948, he was transferred to the Frontier Constabulary where he served for two years. In this capacity, he again endeavored to enter Gilgit region through Kishn Ganga Valley during the War of Liberation but turned back after knowing that Hassan Khan was the Sector Commander there.
In July 1948, William Brown was awarded the MBE (Military) by the British Government with an ‘unspecific citation’ of which he himself admits. Thereafter, he served in Pakistan under many covered appointments till 1959 when he returned to the United Kingdom. He died on December 5, 1984.
Tempering of the Autobiography:
This aspect can be gauged from the fact that this privately produced and not intended for commercial distribution book published in the year 1998 i.e., fourteen years after the death of Major Brown. This book stated to be based on a carbon copy after the loss of two diaries and some omissions, is in actual terms, a thorough templation of events, veering off the aims of Revolution and abrasion of facts to suit deep-rooted British interests. There are also variations in Major Brown’s book now produced and his reports on précis of events forwarded at that time.
There is a cover up in the wake of the general awareness and breadth of outlook of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan and most of it contains cooked up stories and deformation of truth. With the depth of knowledge, it is very easy to pick up lies from concocted narrations and indeed this book further confirms the facts, discards certain assumptions and brings to light many lies. In this context, it is interesting to note that at an important juncture after the Bunji Garrison fell to Hassan Khan, Brown writes:
Jamadar Shah Khan had arrived from Gilgit. I had called him purposely to act as Aide-de-Camp to the Marshal. The latter was much flattered and thanked me profusely.
Jamadar Shah Khan had arrived from Gilgit. I had called him purposely to act as Aide-de-Camp to the Marshal. The latter was much flattered and thanked me profusely.
Brown’s Mission and Motives:
Major Brown oaths all the Muslim officers and JCOs. He scorns locals for their under-developed intellectual talents, factional differences and terms Shinaki tribes as degraded Pathans. He has described Major Hassan Khan as a self-proclaimed Field Marshal, hates unreliable Captain Saeed at first sight. Lieutenant Haider terms Brown as a dirty fish, Brown opines Captain Mohammad Khan to be lacking brains, proclaims untrustworthy Subedar Major Babar Khan to be having a gullible foolish nature, and declares Raja Shah Rais Khan to be the laughable Nawab of Gilgit. He displays no love for Islam; rather fuels sectarianism and in his first report to the Government of Pakistan after revolution spatters and casts sectarian aspersions on the members of the freedom movement.
In his first report to the Government of Pakistan, just after the critical Revolution and before the long-drawn war with India, he does not mention even a word about the looming Indian dangers and spends all his energies in brandishing the leaders of the Revolution and war as potentially dangerous being independent-minded. About the Gilgit Scouts to whom the book is accredited, he rates them as a polo pony with a broken leg as compared with 6J&K Battalion and maintains it to be the height of folly to use the Scouts in direct confrontation with Indian regular troops and away from the Agency.
He further blemishes them to be fully involved in the Gilgit looting and asks from the Government of Pakistan for the first time to lay a colonial precedent of deploying Frontier Constabulary.
As stated in Chapter-2 of the book, Major Brown and his choicest Jock i.e Captain Mathieson were serving on a private contract with the Maharaja of Kashmir on a mutually agreed term of service, until the transition from British to Kashmir had been affected gradually. In the same chapter, Brown admits to ordering Captain Saeed Durrani to proceed to Chilas and ensuring his getting a very tough time there, so as to nullify the possibility of Mathison’s appointment being canceled. Again here, his real motives are sufficiently unveiled by his admission of hectic efforts in Chilas, Gilgit and Gupis to obtain oath of loyalty to Maharaja of Kashmir on Qur’an from all and sundry of Scouts. The afterthought narration that it was done by using a covered Oxford English dictionary is again indicative of labyrinthed portrayals. Anyhow, he mentions that a concerned (who they can be?) were very pleased, especially the Governor when he reported to him about oaths at lunchtime. Then in the evening, he went out fishing with Jamedar Shah Khan, feeling quite at peace with the world.
Another important omission which Brown or his benefactors has made while appreciating the pre-accession situation in this very chapter is Brown’s statement,
If Kashmir acceded to India then my fealty would be with that dominion.
If Kashmir acceded to India then my fealty would be with that dominion.
MAJOR BROWN’S or his benefactors claim that only he, along with Captain Mathison was instrumental in the liberation of Gilgit-Baltistan by putting into operation their well thought out “Operation Datta Khel” into practice at an opportune moment through intuitional twitching is totally absurd and concocted. He manifests that the intuition was felt when his adjutant Lieutenant Haider turned up and declared that the time has come for action. In actual fact, Major Brown was in constant touch through Parsi Wireless operator Limbuwala with Lieutenant Colonel Bacon, Political Agent Khaiber, Sir George Cunningham, Governor-General NWFP and General Sir Douglas Gracey, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army. This can be clearly pieced together through an assiduous study of the book. “Data Khel” was a master plan aiming at complete sabotage and revolved around movement of Sikh troops of 6th J&K Regiment to Gilgit to quell the impending disturbance, as evident from Major Brown’s asking for non-Muslim troops North of Indus from Governor. This action was to be synchronized with the movement of Scouts from Chilas by Mathieson to burn Partab and Ramghat bridges in order to completely isolate Muslim element under Major Hassan Khan (MC) in Bunji and liquidation of the displaced Scouts in Jaglote. Luckily, his plans were foiled by Hassan Khan when he moved along with his Delta Company to Gilgit, instead of Sikhs. As Major Brown was not able to communicate with Mathieson about the new developments, he undertook a very hazardous and expeditious secret trip to Juglote to coordinate the amendments in ‘Datakhel’.The Englis hman’s secretive motives become obvious from the fact that afterward as an advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, he did not disclose to Hassan about the burning of bridges even at the most critical juncture of the attack on vital Bunji Garrison.
There can be no denying the fact that Major Brown was an extremely high caliber Intelligence Officer of the British Intelligence system, employed in their coined ‘Great Game’ of the Highlands of Central Asia. Though partially successful in his mission in the initial stages of the Gilgit Revolution by veering it on unwanted lines, he was fully successful in containing the war effort and freedom of the people of Gigit-Baltistan.
He was indeed, an intelligence professional of the caliber of T.E. Lawrence about whom he writes in chapter-1 of his book:
I am not a hero-worshiper but a man I have always admired as really great is T.E. Lawrence. If circumstances demanded it, I felt I could do in Gilgit what that famous leader had done in Arabia. As will be seen later, I very nearly succeeded but at the critical moment, at the approach of the climax when years of endeavor and preparation were about to be put to the test, I was checked but I was supremely confident would be successful, I was checked; but I was so sure of ultimate victory that I did not feel frustrated but merely rather sorry for those who would have benefited from it.
Brown’s loathing, scorns and connivance:
Ensuing are the views and comments of the Commandant of Gilgit Scouts along with collating facts about the important personalities of the Gilgit Revolution:
Major Hassan Khan(MC):
He was the flag-bearer of the Revolution who twice arrested Major Brown for his nefarious conspiracies in line with those of Gen Gracey. He was four years senior to Brown and was promoted to the rank of Major in 1943 during the Second World War. He was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel during the war of liberation, through a proper notification of Azad Force Headquarters, working under GHQ Rawalpindi. Major Brown and his cronies have done all that was possible to belittle and disfigure him. The following quotes from the book are interesting:
Whatever Hassan’s failings were, one could not help admiring his original initiative.
Little did I know then that there would be times later when we would gladly have buried a knife in each other’s bellies.
Little did I know then that there would be times later when we would gladly have buried a knife in each other’s bellies.
This, therefore, was the last time I ever believed a word of Mirza Hassan’s or relied on him to any extent whatsoever.
Hassan started talking in his usual perfect English and I gathered he was addressing me. “Now, Major Brown, we are very grateful for the help you gave us last night. But you must understand that this blow and all succeeding blows are being struck in the name of Islam, and since you are a non-Muslim, we regret that we cannot allow you to join our glorious band of Ghazis and take part in our Jehad. This, of course, applies to Captain Matheison as well.”
Hassan started talking in his usual perfect English and I gathered he was addressing me. “Now, Major Brown, we are very grateful for the help you gave us last night. But you must understand that this blow and all succeeding blows are being struck in the name of Islam, and since you are a non-Muslim, we regret that we cannot allow you to join our glorious band of Ghazis and take part in our Jehad. This, of course, applies to Captain Matheison as well.”
And now Mirza Hassan, in a sudden burst of wild oratory, proceeded to emulate Hitler in one of his more vociferous moments.
Having reached some way out of Gilgit he halted. He removed badges of rank from his shoulders and replaced them with those of a General.
Mirza Hassan jumped up, General’s badges flashing. “I shall be in it as Commander-in-Chief. I shall be Field Marshal and control all troops in the area, We shall be called the Gilgit Azad (Free) Forces. There will also be a president, a Chief of Military Staff, a Commissioner and a Chief of Police.”
Mirza Hassan then returned to Bunji. He paraded his Azad Forces and produced a Holy Qur’an. He informed them that they would swear an oath that they would march to Gilgit under him and liquidate Mohammad Alam, Matheison and myself. To a man they refused. Completely frustrated, Hassan gave up the struggle. The fun would start in the spring. Except for one small picquet at Juglote, to which the activities of Mirza Hassan across the river, I withdrew all the outlying picquets. He then wrung Jock and me by the hand and burst out: “Major Brown, I have conquered Bunji, tomorrow, I shall march on Kashmir. In a week, I shall have captured Srinagar, and shall be sitting on the throne in the palace of Maharaja. I shall make military history. I shall save the Muslims of Kashmir from the extinction by the Hindus.”
Major Ehsan Ali:
It is confirmed that he had played no role in the initial phase of the Revolution, as he arrived only a day earlier than the D-Day i.e, 1st November 1947 and that too with all his family members. The only mention of him in this book is of his arrest by Hassan Khan to elude his influence over Muslim elements of J&K Regiment. Major Brown mentions,
“My name’s Ehsan Ali. I think you are Major Brown. Most awfully glad to meet you, old boy. Always been wanting to. A bit thick, this business, isn’t it? It soon dawned on me who he was. He was one of the local Nagar lads who had gone off to seek his fortune and had done well for himself in the State Forces, I gathered that Mirza Hassan had put him under arrest, evidently seeing in him a possible rival for Commander-in-Chief. However, opened custody seemed to me to be the appropriate answer at the moment, with the Nagar situation so tricky, so I made no effort to release him. He might be useful later. Look here, old boy, “I said, “as you can see, I am up to the eyes in work. Do you mind very much taking Colonel Majid into the garden here – and waiting half an hour or so until I can straighten your affair out, “Not at all, not at all, always glad to help. No chance of a beer, I supposed? I’m bloody well parched after that journey.”
“My name’s Ehsan Ali. I think you are Major Brown. Most awfully glad to meet you, old boy. Always been wanting to. A bit thick, this business, isn’t it? It soon dawned on me who he was. He was one of the local Nagar lads who had gone off to seek his fortune and had done well for himself in the State Forces, I gathered that Mirza Hassan had put him under arrest, evidently seeing in him a possible rival for Commander-in-Chief. However, opened custody seemed to me to be the appropriate answer at the moment, with the Nagar situation so tricky, so I made no effort to release him. He might be useful later. Look here, old boy, “I said, “as you can see, I am up to the eyes in work. Do you mind very much taking Colonel Majid into the garden here – and waiting half an hour or so until I can straighten your affair out, “Not at all, not at all, always glad to help. No chance of a beer, I supposed? I’m bloody well parched after that journey.”
Captain Saeed Durrani:
It is proved that besides Subedar Major Babar Khan, he was the most trusted ally of Hassan Khan. In fact, he was Hassan’s Deputy in the Secret Revolutionary Council. He came to Gilgit along with Brig Ghansara Singh to take over Gilgit Scouts. About him, Brown writes:
I immediately summed Saeed up as potentially unreliable and a man who would have to be watched carefully.
In the context of fragmenting Hassan’s colleagues, he writes about him,
“You are going to Kalandarchi, and you will leave tomorrow morning without fail”, I ordered calmly, though possessed with a great desire to punch him on the end of his long nose.
Captain Mohammad Khan Jaral:
He was a Scout officer and a colleague of Hassan in the pan to overthrow Dogra regime. About him he writes,
Mohammad Khan was small, cheerful and bouncy. An ex-ranker, he was not over blessed with brains, but he looked on life with a carefree, happy attitude.
He further mentions that Lt Haider told him in a slightly tipsy mumble that he is not interested in politics and his main object in life is sleeping with women. In the context of scattering Hassan’s colleagues, he writes,
A brainwave struck me. Why not get rid of Mohammad Khan by having him posted to Bunji? I would ensure that the order one would be Mohammad Khan from Gilgit by hook or by crook. This was a Heaven-sent opportunity to get rid of Mohammad Khan, but it was necessary to show no eagerness which might arouse suspicion.
Lt. Haider:
He was acting as adjutant of Gilgit Scouts and was cultivated by Major Hassan Khan in his pan for the liberation of Gilgit-Baltistan. It is very interesting to know views of both about each other. Lt. Haider’s diary of that period states:
Brown arrested by Hassan on 1st November but released on my insistence. He remained ineffective till Muslim officers ruled Gilgit, but started showing his colors once Pakistani Political Agent Sardar Alam came into the arena. He was a cunning person who was able to convince the new administration about his vital role in the liberation of Gilgit, impress the local rulers of his importance and ensured ouster of Muslim officers.
His diary further states,
Major Brown was a dirty fish – my mistakes- at the start of revolt I had good opinion about him. He had given false impression in Pakistan. Cunning Brown thinks of me to be an obstruction in his way. I told Khan Qayyum, Chief Minister of NWFP about him.
On the other hand, Brown writes about him:
I liked Haider on first sight.” Then “That evening Haider attempted to pump my sentiments from me but I played the neutral observer and showed him the political situation in the light of a comic opera. He laughed much and drank more than was good for him. I had grown to like him very much but the time was far from ripe when I could lay my cards on the table.
In another portion of the book he mentions,
But which side was Haider on? I know that his family and his property were in Srinagar. If he joined the rebels, he would lose everything; his family would be imprisoned, probably quietly liquidated and all his possessions would be forfeited. Was it not possible, therefore, that he supported the Maharaja and was now acting for the Governor in attempting to ascertain my sentiments? On the other hand, he was a Muslim, and as such should naturally side with Pakistan. I, therefore, gave a guarded reply.
But which side was Haider on? I know that his family and his property were in Srinagar. If he joined the rebels, he would lose everything; his family would be imprisoned, probably quietly liquidated and all his possessions would be forfeited. Was it not possible, therefore, that he supported the Maharaja and was now acting for the Governor in attempting to ascertain my sentiments? On the other hand, he was a Muslim, and as such should naturally side with Pakistan. I, therefore, gave a guarded reply.
Haider answers Brown in these words,
I am not mixed up in this business of Mirza Hassan’s at all.
I have pretended I was uptill now to prevent difficulties, but I’m not really. I’m not, I’m not, I assure you, Sir. All I want to see is Gilgit a part of Pakistan. I don’t want any bloodshed. I admit we used to hold secret meetings before the revolt. I admit that everything was planned as you heard this afternoon. But my heart was not in it;
Needless to say, Hassan was well supported by Saeed during this speech. When Hassan had announced this plan. Ghulam Haider jumped to his feet. “You can count me out of this. I’m for Pakistan.” And with that he left the room. “We’ll fix you later, you traitor” I shouted Hassan. But Hassan had managed to convince some of the other members that this was a sound pan.
Subedar Major Babar Khan:
The true greatness of Babar Khan be ascertained by placing him in the correct perspective, which in short was siding with Hassan Khan for the overthrow of the Dogra yoke of slavery, despite numerous pulls and pressures which he was personally subjected to. Hassan Khan’s dynamic personality, his political nature i.e, he was the founder of the first political party of Gilgit-Baltistan, his anti-establishment stance and his later involvement/imprisonment in Rawalpindi conspiracy case; provided an opportunity to the establishment as well as his enemies and opportunists to belittle his achievements through a tangled web of lies. They initially tried to blow Babar Khan out of proportion and when it became impossible due to incoming flow of information and harmful for their own interest; they raised the bogey of Major Brown. It is pertinent to mention that Babar was bitterly against Brown and use to complaint against him to Hassan and has claimed that he arrested Brown before moving up to arrest Governor Ghansara. The under-mentioned extracts about Babar Khan from various points of Brown’s book clearly indicate towards afore-mentioned assertion:-
At the very initial stages of his return to Gilgit i.e chapter-2, he writes,
I kept Babar behind when the others left , and had a straight talk with him. He and I had never been the best of friends and had many differences of opinion on Scout and political matters, I therefore told him straight that we had a difficult time ahead of us and the only way to succeed was for both of us to bury the hatchet and start afresh in friendship and cooperation. He agreed and we reached an understanding.
About their demands to be presented to Governor Brig Ghansara Singh, he writes,
This rather took the wind out of the Indian officers’ sails. Discussions and clarifications now took place on the points included in the petition, and from the ignorance displayed by most of the Indian officers, I rapidly came to the conclusion that the whole matter had been concocted by Baber himself and a few chosen cronies without reference either to the other officers or to the rank and file. This lack of unity meant there was little danger of an issue being forced so I ceased to worry.
I know I had complete control over six platoons of the Scouts and could make them obey my will, whatever it might be. These were the three Hunza platoons, the Punial platoon, the Kuh Ghizar platoon and the Yasin platoon. I had no faith in the three Nagir platoons. They were in the power of the Subedar Major, who if led astray by others, through his gullible nature might do any foolish act. The Gilgit platoon was, I thought, unreliable and might do anything.
It is important to note that Baber Khan could have been led astray by none other than Hassan Khan.
While assessing various personalities in the wake of the gathering storm, he writes,
Subedar Major Baber Khan I also did not trust, but nothing could be done about it. Any attempt to get rid of him would give grounds for grave suspicion, and might have regrettable consequences. He would have to stay.
About Baber’s docile nature, he sarcastically writes,
I would then be subjected to a futile hour of, “Whatever you think best Sahib, of course Sahib, very difficult Sahib, God knows Sahib”
and so on, concluding with a long-winded account of the loyal services of his grandfather, father and he himself had rendered to the British.
In the context of arresting Governor, he writes,
Why I did not carry out this order myself or sent Haider rather than entrusting the job to the Subedar Major? Well there are several reasons. Firstly, I did not yet entirely trust Baber or any of the Nagir Scouts, which follows, of course because the later were completely under his influence. In my opinion as of that time, they were as likely to side with the Maharaja’s cause as that of Pakistan.
I had also noticed that when I was allotting reserve ammunition to the platoon proceeding to Bhoop Singh Pari, Baber had urged me to issue an amount vastly in excess of that required. In fact he had tried to make me empty the magazine completely. This was very suspicious.
While describing the event of the arrest of the Governor Brig Ghansara Singh, he humiliates Baber by writing,
When the Scouts in the garden had completed a small drill movement of the right dressing and standing at ease, Babar and Jamedar Shah Sultan of Nagir drew their pistols and entered the house. As they crossed the threshold, the Dogra orderly flashed a torch on them and the Governor let fly with his rifle. Fortunately for them he missed. Baber and Shah Sultan then took to their heels and must have broken all records for the hundreds yards in a prudent dash for the safety of the garden.
“Baber is simply a gullible fool”, Haider replied
“Hassan”, Haider went on, is merely using Baber as a tool, just as he is using Shah Rais too.
Baber has been promised the post of Assistant Commander-in-Chief. Hassan knows that Baber has complete control over the Gilgit and Nagir platoons in the event of a showdown, so he is out to keep Baber happy at the moment. The same with Shah Rais Khan, who has influence over the subdivision mob. Hassan will use these two until he has set himself up as Military Governor of the whole Agency and Wazarat, and he will then throw them away like old gloves. But both are such idiots they cannot see this.
When our pipes were lit, we attempted to draw out Baber and Muzaffar, by making them do some straight talking regarding the situation and their intentions. They were both extremely reticent but this, I think, was due to their inability to reach a decision on their future course of action rather than an attempt to hide anything. This much I did gather that Muzaffar was entirely loyal to both of us and had absolutely no time for Mirza Hassan and his United States of Gilgit. Obviously, this was the bone of contention between the two brothers.
About Baber’s promotion which he arranged, he writes,
The ulterior and unofficial motive of the promotion was that it closed the door to Baber, against any possibility, however sight, of using his undeniable influence over the Nagir contingent, and the folk of the subdivision, to create trouble. Henceforth, as a responsible officer holding a Pakistan Commission, he was morally bound to support Mohammad Alam in every way. The result fulfilled my every expectation.
About an important Juncture after the arrival of Pakistan Political Agent, he writes,
The conference ended in a private interview with Subedar Major Baber Khan in which the PA pointed out to him in front of the Mirs how foolish he had been behaving in allying with himself with Captain Hassan and that he must control his gullible nature and appreciate situations properly in discerning between right and wrong. He was admonished to return to his post as Subedar Major immediately and to refrain from meddling in other affairs.
Subedar Jan Alam:
The first casualty of Brown among Hassan Khan’s colleagues was Subedar Jan Alam. He was the first among the Scouts, who was cultivated for the cause of independence and was stationed at Chilas. In actual fact he was dismissed from service by Major Brown, who cleverly writes about him,
The resignation of the Nagir Platoon Commander, Subedar Jan Alam, was significant in itself. He refused to give any reasons for this resignation except for the lame excuse of a bad leg. But obviously foresaw trouble in which he had no wish to take part.
The discontentment of the Scouts at Chilas can be gauged from this quotation from the book,
The telegram was addressed to the Governor, and the office of the origin was Chilas. It read, Unless Subedar Jan Alam reinstated as our Platoon commander immediately, accept the resignation of whole platoon – stop (Signed) No.10 Platoon, Nagar.
Brown was highly prejudiced towards Nagiris i.e Babar Khan and had a soft corner for Shah Khan and his people as evident from the display of attitude while carrying out recruitment,
I appointed the vacancies as follows, tentatively. On paper, Hunza and Nagir were to provide 250 recruits each. In actual fact, I would work it so that Hunza provided 300 and Nagir 200 by discarding 50 of the latter as physically unsound, which would not be difficult. On the other hand, I could rely on the Mir of Hunza to provide 300 of the best fighting types available in Central Asia.
Wireless operator Mr. Limbuwala was a very special and significant ally of Brown.
Confirmations, Creation of Smokescreen and Loopholes:
Major Brown’s book is an extremely valuable book in the sense that it provides answers to many unresolved conspiracies and fills in the voids of the complete logical story-building of the initial and most vital days of the Revolution at Gigit. Furthermore, it fully authenticates the account of Mirza Hassan Khan given in his book “Shamsher say Zanjeer Tak”. Major Brown’s book is, in actual fact, an exceptionally high intelligence work formulated at this point of the time by taking into account what al information on the subject is already available to the general public, with the intention of still bluffing the Government of Pakistan, appeasing Indians and further enhancing the designs of Anglo-American axis; ironically at the cost of the suffering masses of Gilgit-Baltistan, for whose betterment his only suggestion is an alien rue with an iron hand. The numerous revelations of this book are grouped together under suitable headings in the succeeding paragraphs:-
About various customary demands which were put across to Brig Ghansara Singh, the newly arrived Governor of Gilgit-Baltistan, he writes,
I scanned through the list. The requests (as I called them) were with regard to the betterment of conditions of service. Some were reasonable and some were utter nonsense. But the important thing was that it was obvious that the Scouts were endeavoring to get as much as they possibly could out of the Kashmir Government. Now, if at that period the Scouts had intended to revolt in three months' time against the Kashmir regime, it is most unlikely that they would have submitted these requests, most of which are in connection with long-term benefits such as pensions and gratuities.
Major Brown fully avoids the confirmed fact of Hassan Khan’s stormy move from Srinagar to Gigit and his arrest orders thereafter, for the simple reason that even a slight mention of this; fully crashes the edifice of his artfully self-accredited story. However, his slipshod here and there are very obvious. He cleverly conceals his intimate, planning contacts and understanding with Governor Ghansara Singh. In the context of organizing a political Jalsa/function at Gilgit to celebrate the birthday of Maharaja Hari Singh with the real panned intention of arresting Hassan by ordering Commanding officer 6th J&K with a Sikh Company and Major Hassan to attend, which Hassan foiled by participating along with his fully armed Muslim Company, he writes,
Governor Brig Ghansara Singh explained that close relationship was required between the Scouts and the 6th Kashmir Infantry at Bunji. He had therefore arranged that the Battalion should come to Gilgit for a few days so that friendly contact could be established. Actually, this was correct, but on the account did I want the 6th Kashmir Infantry housed where they had access to all the important magazines and rifle kotes, once they were in their possession, the Scout would be no more use than a polo pony with a broken leg.
While analyzing various factors during his appreciation of the situation during ‘The Gathering Storm’ phase, Brown writes about Hassan Khan’s 6th Kashmir Infantry,
The 6th Kashmir Infantry was the greatest factor in the whole enterprise. The battalion consisted of about five hundred men. One-third were Sikhs, one-third were Dogras, and one-third were Muslims. The battalion was well trained, with an excellent war record, and was equipped with all modern weapons such as Bren guns, Stenguns, 3 inch mortars, and grenades; a great contrast to the Scouts. There was no doubt that the Sikhs and Dogras were implicitly loyal to the Maharaja and they would fight to the last man and the last round in opposing a revolt in the Gilgit Province. The Muslims are a doubtful quantity. They might remain loyal to Kashmir, they might forego their allegiance and join their co-religionists. It was impossible to say at that stage.
Hassan Khan in his memoirs mentions that among the Scouts, he started work of indoctrination from the Gilgit Scouts, stationed at Chilas. After the dismissal of Subedar Jan Alam at Chilas by Brown, he inadvertently writes,
“Now apropos of recent incident in Chilas, my own informers brought me information that the new notorious Nagir Havaldar, whose name incidentally was Nadilo, was in the habit of holding daily conversation on the telephone with Captain Mirza Hassan Khan in Bunji. They were unable to give me details of the theme of these talks, however. So I summed up the situation as follows. There would shortly be a revolt in the Gilgit Province in favour of Pakistan. The revolt be led by the Scouts backed by the Muslim element of the 6th Kashmir Infantry.
Even a cursory reading of “The Gathering Storm” and “Coup d’etat” chapters of the book clearly point towards the fact that the events were thrust upon Brown and that he had taken nobody into confidence for his later assumed role of the liberator of Gilgit-Baltistan. The under-mentioned clippings from the book also bring into the limelight; adherence by Hassan Khan and his colleagues of the important principles of war of unity of Command, security and thorough cohesive planning:-
Para-5 of the Brown’s report on the précis of Recent Events in Gilgit Agency (1 Aug 1947 to 10 March 1948) reads,
Major Brown and Captain Mathieson soon realized that an underground movement was at work, the members of which, and the actual power of which, could not be ascertained. It seemed that certain local people, under the guise of pro-Pakistan activities, were aspiring to political power, but the strength of the movement could not be gauged accurately nor could it be considered dangerous.
Para-25 of his above-mentioned report reads,
The results of the conference were extremely interesting. The suspicions of both British officers regarding an underground pro-Pakistan movement proved to be correct. Those attending the conference now made clear to Major Brown what had been afoot. The movement comprised: Captain Hassan Khan (Kashmir State Forces), Captain Mohammad Saeed (attached Gilgit Scouts), Lieutenant Ghulam Haider (attached Gilgit Scouts) – this officer was working for Pakistan only and had and had no personal ambitions, as had the others), Subedar Major Mohammad Babar Khan (Gilgit Scouts), ex-Subedar Shah Rais Khan, pus 80% of the Indian officers of the Gilgit Scouts and 70% of the other ranks.
About knowing the time of action from Lt Haider and of the events little after, he writes,
And what can I do for you, Lieutenant Haider? I asked jokingly, smearing oil over the flannelette.
It’s you who are fiddling now, fiddling out shooting while Gilgit burns, Sir, “he replied with a nervous laugh.He helped himself to a very large whisky and lit a cigarette with shaking fingers, stained yellow with nicotine. I grasped that he meant immediately. Although I knew it was coming any day now, I felt a momentary alarm grip me. In flash, I regained my composure.
“Right, let’s have it” I said sitting down.
Haider began, “The Scouts are still under control and quiet. The Indian officers have gathered in the Subedar Major’s bungalow and are discussing the situation. They don’t seem to be getting very far through and they are like a flock of sheep without a shepherd. Half the 6th Kashmir Infantry have crossed the Partab Pul and are marching towards Gilgit on Governor’s orders. Something will have to be done quickly or there’s going to be a bust-up like nobody’s business” on another occasion. “I motioned to the Indian officers to sit down and sat down myself. They were all looking extremely worried. Baber gazed glumly at the floor muttering, “bara mushkil, Sahib mushkil”, which means very difficult” Sir, very difficult. “What Sahib, I ask, is very difficult.”
I said. “We are more or less responsible for the present situation,”Baber replied, “Our intention is to stage a revolution in Gigit in favour of Pakistan. We have not told you up till now, as we were not sure what side you would take. Tonight is the night fixed for the revolt. Our plan of action. And here Baber’s speech was interrupted by a sudden outburst of babble by the other Indian officers.Each was shouting in his own language but I gathered through the din that there was considerable disagreement as to the plan of action. “Shut up, a of you” I bellowed “Tell me”, I continued calmly, “what part do the 6th Kashmir Infantry take in these fun and games.”
I’ll explain this. “Said Haider entering the conversation. “The Muslim Company is in this up to the neck, under the command of Mirza Hassan. The Sikh and Dogra companies are on their way to Gilgit. The Muslim company is left in Bunji and tonight will secure the magazine and rifle kotes and will arrest any Sikhs and Dogras left behind. The operation will be carried out by Mirza Hassan; Colonel Majid will also be put under arrest.
A very important fact is confirmed that Major Hassan was instrumental in Governor’s arrest and that he arrived before his arrest. In the coup d’etat chapter he writes,
I now received word through an orderly that Captain Hassan had arrived and was partaking of breakfast in Haider’s bungalow. I went there immediately and found him tucking into scrambled eggs and toast. He stood up as I entered the room and greeted me effusively with a cry of; “Pakistan Zindaabad Major Brown, It’s good to know you are on our side too. Good show, good show.” He was magnificently decked out in uniform and looked quite the picture book general. “Pakistan Zindabad,” I replied in return “Now look here, Hassan old boy, you and I have got to get down to work if this revolt is going to be successful.” I then roughly sketched out my plans.
Now there can be no denying the fact that on the orders of Commander-in-Chief Hassan Khan of the Islamic Republic of Gilgit-Baltistan, Major Brown was arrested. He himself writes with a revile,As I reached the corner of the road, I ran into a half platoon of Scouts led by Havildar Firdous Ali Khan, who was Shah Rais Khan’s son. The Scouts advanced. I backed against the wall. I would go down fighting, if I had to go down. Firdos gave me a message from the Subedar Major. I remain in my bungalow under the protection of Firdos and his men until the situation was under control. I understood immediately that Said and Mirza Hassan had appreciated that they could make little headway with their Provisional Government so long as I was present. The Indian officers, and even Baber and Shah Rais to a certain extent, were under my influence.
Smokescreen:
As brought out earlier, the entire book is intended to create a smokescreen for the benefit of all and sundry except the exploited people of Gilgit-Baltistan. Major Brown claims that only he along with Captain Mathieson formed the pan, which was the swansong of Kashmir rue in the Gilgit province. He reiterates the claim by writing that assuming that the Maharaja of Kashmir would accede to the Indian Union, our object was to perform a coup d’etat in Gilgit with as little bloodshed and disturbance as possible and then accede to Pakistan of our own accord. The wily William Brown gives an impression in this book that the sentiments of all the British of that time lay with Pakistan. He again downplays Hassan in his spectacular assault across River Indus attack on Bunji by claiming that it happened because he got a message signed from captive Brig Ghansara Singh for non-Muslim Bunji troops to lay down arms, which was passed by Hassan Khan to Bunji. Major Brown was a master of deceit, as is obvious from the impression which he gave to the then slave-minded rulers of Pakistan. In the endgame chapter he writes,
As soon as possible, Lt Col Iskandar Mirza, CIE, OBE, Defence Secretary to the Pakistan Government, flew up to Peshawar from Karachi to hear the first-hand account of the revolt in Gilgit. He was an old friend of Colonel Bacon’s; they had been at Sandhurst together. We went to meet him at the aerodrome and took him straight to Khyber House. Time was short, as he was leaving for Lahore after lunch, so we got down business immediately on the lawn, bathed in the warm sunshine of a winter’s day.
In the para-26 and 27 of his report to the Government of Pakistan on the précis of events from 1 August to 16 November 1947, in the Gilgit Agency, he dubs the leaders of the freedom movement as working for the establishment of an independent state and that to oppose the wishes of military cabal for British officers at that time would have been suicidal.
Loopholes:
Major Brown and his cronies have definitely underestimated the intellectual potential of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan and must have thought that his bluffs will work. Luckily, all the luminaries of those turbulent times have made written statements, which are available now. A collation and interpretation of these thoroughly uncover the evil-mindedness of Brown. The following excerpts should be of some interest:-
About Ram Chander Kak’s forced resignation as Prime Minister of the State of Jammu and Kashmir due to unfair policies of the Maharaja Kashmir and his subsequent imprisonment, he writes,
I might add that Pandit Kak was one of the shrewdest men I have ever met. A Hindu himself, he saw that the future peace and prosperity of Kashmir lay in her joining Pakistan. And he and his brother Pandits could only continue their trade of amassing legal and illegal wealth in a peaceful and prosperous country. There would be no pace for the cowardly Pandits in a clash of arms.
He displays complete ignorance of Major Hassan Khan’s arrest orders from Srinagar sent to Gilgit, even before his arrival there and accords it a different colour by writing,
Evidently a few days ago, there had been a disturbance in the lines of the 6th Kashmir Infantry. The Sikhs and Dogras on the one hand and the Musims on the other had banded together and attacked one another, each shouting their respective war cries of “Hindustan Zindabad” and “Pakistan Zindabad”. By the remarkable Frontier Telegraph, which I have already described, the news of this incident reached Srinagar before it reached Gilgit. An express telegram was sent to the Governor of Gilgit Province by the Kashmir Government, ordering him to place Captain Mirza Hassan of the 6th Kashmir Infantry under close arrest forthwith and to send him under escort to Srinagar. The Governor, after consultation with Colonel Majid, decided to take no action on this order, which if obeyed would most certainly have lit the fuse of the powder barrel.
While suggesting various options to Governor Brig Ghansara Singh in wake of "Gathering Storm", he grossly overestimates himself and presents a meaningful suggestion,
The second course open to you is that you, your staff, and the 6th Kashmir Infantry pack your bags, and clear off to Srinagar. Leave the Province to decide its own destiny. The most powerful man left will take over charge of the country, that is to say, I shall assume the duties of Governor. If you are court-marshaled, as soon as order is eventually restored, I shall back you up to the best of my ability, and I shall prove to the prosecution that the action you took was the only one feasible under the circumstances.
Major Brown or most probably his benefactors have very foolishly misportrayed a very well known event of the crucial night of 31 October/1 November 1947, by stating,
The contingent consisted of about two hundred Muslim Sepoys under Colonel Majid and Captain Mirza Hassan. This was rather starting news. Evidently, Majid had been clever enough to see the showdown that would result if he brought the Sikhs or Dogras to Gilgit; so on receipt of the message from the Governor he had set of himself with the Muslims. Majid, however, had far too much control over his battalion for my liking. The only way to paralyze the dangerous potentialities of the entire unit was to separate the Colonel completely from his men. So I sent back a message that the Colonel should be placed under arrest immediately and it is imperative that I should see Mirza Hassan immediately so that we could coordinate a plan in the light of this new development. So I asked him to come with all speed to Gilgit.”
Truth always finds its own unknown ways to be made known and the same happened with Major Brown, when he reached Peshawar in order to misrepresent the facts and and tarnish the images of dedicated freedom fighters. He states,
He was not surprised, but extremely interested as the only news which had reached Peshawar regarding the revolt was a pack of distorted facts and lies which evidently Saeed had given to the pilot, Ahmed, when the latter flew Mohammad Alam in.
Sabotage:
Major Brown was a highly experienced person in the affairs of Gilgit and therefore resorted to very deep-rooted acts of sabotage. In this context, his admission is astonishing. He writes,
But for any scheme in Gilgit, of the magnitude and importance of the one we were planning. Hamlet decisions are required, decision sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought, of political consideration, tribal structures, religious jealousies, mistrust, in addition to strategy and tactics.”
A selected mention of some aspects with brief analysis is surely going to be an eye-opener:-
In the compilation and disposition aspect of all the Scout Platoons, he writes,
Hunza, Punial, Yasin and Kuh Ghizr were complete under my control. This represented six platoons, and most of headquarters, giving a total strength of about three hundred and fifty rifles. We were at that time not so sure Nagir and Gilgit subdivision, with four platoons numbering about two hundred men. Dispositions would therefore have to be arranged so that there was majority of platoons of unquestioned loyalty in Gilgit headquarters and Chilas. The decision of the Hunza, Punial, Yasin, and Kuh Ghizr platoons as to whether to join this revolt regardless of the way I decided to cast my lot. In Gilgit headquarters there was only one Nagir platoon now No.2, led by Long John’s younger brother Shah Sultan, since No. 8 platoon had reluctantly hit the Gupis trail. So with Nagir in the minority and no Gilgities I was spared from the troubles Jock was having in Chilas where Nagir and Gilgit made up half the garrisons. One final matter remained before I was satisfied that the decks were cleared for action, and this was the removal of Captain Mohammad Saeed from the scene of operations. It was also time now that Kalamdarchi Fort should be evacuated and No.1 platoon (Hunza) withdrawn to Gilgit. The latter could be used as a means towards the former.”
It is said on gravestones of Major Brown is engraved the legend, “DATA KHEL 31.10.47”. This secret pan as stated was conceived by Major Brown and Captain Matheison at Chilas and was to be put into immediate effect as soon as this codeword was signaled to Mathieson at Chilas by Brown for the coup d’etat, so that according to Brown
Set up my own administration of the entire province.
This in actual fact was the pinnacle of sabotage; task and mission of Major Brown. It initially aimed at control of the Gilgit area north of Indus by inviting Sikh troops from Bunji to Gilgit and isolation of Major Hassan Khan’s rebellious Muslim troops in Bunji through the burning of Partab and Ramghat Bridges on River Indus and Astore respectively, by moving Scouts from Chilas and Gilgit both. This would have been followed by the engagement and liquidation of Hassan Khan’s troops in Bunji by a numerically superior Sikh/Dogra Force and annihilation of the troublesome displaced Scouts of Chilas at the hands of the Sikhs. This would have been followed by the move of an Indian Army Expeditionary Force; said to be of a Brigade strength from Bandipura/Srinagar. This vital information has been disclosed by Brown in his book, but interestingly; he never meaningfully disclosed it to all concerned. However, Hassan Khan mentions in his memoirs about this juncture that news were in the air that an Indian brigade was concentrating in Bandipura area to invade Gilgit-Baltistan. These were the salient features of this nefarious plan, which doomed to a great extent by Hassan Khan’s superior strategy and initiative, but ultimately Brown succeeded in detracting the ultimate aims of the revolution, resulting into a new form of slavery for the unlucky people of Gilgit-Baltistan. It is stunning to note Brown’s remarks about the amendments made in the original plan. He writes,
As later events will show, my summing up of the situation was not entirely correct; in rifle shooting language I scored a good inner but not a bull. Fortunately, the mistake I made was not irretrievable, but it showed that my intelligence system was not as good as I thought it was.
The intensity of Major Brown’s intrigues can be gauged from the fact that even after the arrest of Governor Ghansara Singh and his appointment as an advisor to Commander-in-Chief Hassan Khan, he did not disclose even a word about the move of Scouts from Chilas towards Bunji and their burning of both the bridges connecting Bunji. This information was very vital for Hassan Khan’s attack on Bunji. At this historical point in time, Brown undertaken a very secretive, hasty and lonely riding trip to Jaglot in order to coordinate the amendments with Captain Mathieson, who had reached there. He admits his planned burning of Partab Bridge, but disowns burning of Ramghat bridge. He takes great pains in covering his nefarious plan but most of it is beating about the bush with numerous slipshod for a careful reader; who comes across many confusions and contradictions with a tinge of charming fiction. Some of the important quotes from the book are reproduced as under:-
A fighting patrol from Gilgit would liquidate the 6th Kashmir Infantry picquets at Jaglote and Partab Pull Bridge.
About his anxiety to pass the codeword “Data Khel” to Mathieson in Chilas, he writes,
I was desperately anxious to see that there was no mistake about the message to Chilas. It was much more important, actually, than the musketry competition going on up the hill”
i.e, the efforts for the arrest of Brig Ghansara. A glimpse of his original plan becomes obvious when writes, “From the fact that Jock (Mathison) had received no word from his No.1 Patrol, it seemed possible that the Sikh and Dogra troops had managed to cross the river and had wiped out the Scouts.”
In the context of amendments to be incorporated in the original operation “Data Khel” as a result of Hassan Khan’s unexpected move to Gilgit instead of Sikhs, he writes,
If this was correct, then the journey would be extremely dangerous. It did not matter. I knew I could get through on my own. The only thing that mattered now was that Jock and I must meet immediately and coordinate a plan. It was too dangerous to order and Indian officer to accompany me. I had a better chance alone anyway. I would probably kill the horse, I rode through hard riding.
Captain Mthieson briefs Brown about the inner feelings of troublesome Scouts at Chilas who were ordered to move to Jaglote in these words,
The next really serious incident was when gasht number I had fallen in prior to departure. As attempt was made by some subversive to prevent the patrol setting out for Jagote. They were told that the whole show was a trap arranged by you, me and old Guv (Ghansara Singh). At some point on the road the 6th Kashmir Infantry were lying in ambush and would fall on the Scouts and wipe them out to a man.
Major Brown or his sympathizers have committed many blunders in this book, which clearly indicate towards the dubious and covert nature of Major Brown’s role. Following is worth noticing:-
From the very beginning Major Brown has given an impression of being at loggerheads with Governor Brig Ghansara Singh, but fails at some occasions to conceal the real understanding. One such example is in the context of trouble making Scouts at Chilas. He writes,
I then gave the Governor the gist to what had been happening in Chilas, according to what Jock (Mathieson) had told me in his letter. I explained that there was nothing to worry about as Captain Mathieson had the situation well under control,
He had listened to the news of sending troops by the Government of India into Kashmir on 25 October 1947, but makes no efforts to make it known to any other.
He makes a very shrewd suggestion to Governor Brig Ghansara Singh at a very critical time in these words,
I suggest you hold an immediate referendum in the Province. It goes without saying that the result will be in favor of accession to Pakistan but that is beside the point. You can then announce that the will of the people has been ascertained, though confirmation must be kept pending until a plebiscite is completed in the rest of Kashmir. The Governor General of India has made it clear that such a plebiscite will be held as soon as order is restored. With the will of people here a fait accompli, you can continue to govern the Province in a temporary capacity, though I would suggest that you feign a nervous breakdown and handover charge to Colonel Majid who is a Muslim.
The biggest act of sabotage carried out by Brown after his failure to undo the revolution was beyond doubt a very negative portrayal of the leader of Revolution Major Hassan Khan, other leading figures and the simple masses of Gilgit-Baltistan. The following is of immense interest:-
While addressing Brown, Hassan says,
We know of course that you are loyal to Pakistan – all Britishers are but it is not our intention to join Pakistan. We intend to setup an independent, Islamic State called the United States of Gilgit, and although we shall keep the friendliest relations with Pakistan we shall in no way owe allegiance to that dominion. We shall start the new state off by hanging the Mirs and Maharajas over the Gilgit bridge by their necks; we shall then cut the throats of all the Sikhs and Hindus in Gilgit and throw them in the river. We shall line up the non-Muslim elements of the 6th Kashmir Infantry on the banks of the Indus at Bunji and mow them down with machine guns. In the blood of the tyrants and unbelievers, we shall build up a new and glorious state.
He displays a very crucial attitude towards the poor but highly motivated troops of 6th Kashmir Infantry Battalion in these words,
The Muslim Sepoys had nothing to lose now. Having mutinies, they dared not return to their homes in Kashmir; we had not sufficient rations in the Agency to feed them. Trouble makers such as Mirza Hassan and Said could lead the force and this word rid the Agency of them. They would get plenty of scope for Jehad in Skardu with a Dogra platoon to dispose off and a Treasury to loot.
He had a very prejudiced attitude towards the Muslim elements of 6th Kashmir Infantry as obvious from his request in person to Prime Minister Liaqat Ai Khan,
To base the Muslim element of the old 6th Kashmir Infantry in Bunji as completely separate unit from the Scouts. All the officers of the Kashmir State Forces should join this unit and none of them should be allowed to enter Gilgit Agency, without the Political Agent’s permission.
Fueling Sectarianism:
During the preparatory as well as execution phase of the sacred Revolution of Gilgit-Baltistan and thereafter in the fifteen months of a long war with India, there was no question of any sectarianism at any level and at any place. All segments of the population of Gilgit-Baltistan, Chitral and Azad Kashmir participated in this holy struggle without any prejudice of caste, creed and sect. The question arises as to what made the highly motivated elements of 6th J&K Battalion to revolt for the cause of Islam at far-flung Bunji? They and their officers were overwhelmingly Sunnis. Similarly, the Scouts, bodyguards and civilian participants of the War of Liberation were drawn from various religio-cultural entities and there was no symptom of sectarianism at all. It is worth mentioning here that during the entire Dogra regime in Gilgit-Baltistan, they never ever resorted to this dirtiest method of divide and rule. Brown started the game on these lines for the first time with ulterior motives and he gave an obnoxious impression about it to the authorities in Pakistan.Some revelations from Major Brown’s book in this regard are shocking. After the arrest of Governor Ghansara, people got together in the Shahi Polo Ground. Brown describes this mob as ninety per cent Shias.
While listening to the speech of Major Hassan Khan, after the revolt, he observes “I cocked up my ears, especially as I noted the Shiah contingent nodding their heads in approval. This was very interesting and fitted into the picture of my suspicions. So at least some of these people were out to seize compete power for themselves? So their motives were not to join Gilgit to Pakistan. Very interesting indeed.” “With this final burst of oratory and flourish of his riding whip, Mirza Hassan sank back in his chair, his face flushed.” “Hear, hear!, shouted Shiah contingent, obviously overcome by this dynamic personality.”
“Multitude of thoughts now flashed through my mind in a matter of seconds, Hassan’s plan was obviously a pot of the Shiahs to gain complete control of the Agency. They would then set up an entirely Shiah administration. The result would be civil war and absolute chaos. For all I knew, and Indian Army Expeditionary Force might at this very moment be setting out from Bandipur.” We had a very awkward afternoon. Every unemployed Gushpur and ex-Government official in the Agency arrived in Gilgit and demanded well paid jobs under the new provisional Government. They made it quite clear that they considered the new Government an entirely Shiah-sponsored concern and they urged its immediate dissolution and the formation of a representative administration. Shah Rais Khan and I managed to persuade the disgruntled Gushpurs to return to home. But the seeds of Sunni-Shiah faction feeling were above ground now.”
After Baber Khan’s promotion, he writes, “The others asked, if one, why not another? Why should Nagir only get the sugar plum?
And the devilish trouble-makers of the subdivision surreptitiously hinted further Shiah domination.”
Constitutional Wrangling:
Major William Brown will always be remembered by the people of Gilgit-Baltistan as a saboteur of their just rights; as a result of their indigenous unparalleled struggle for freedom and a villain of their present constitutional imbroglio. He had a complete say on the affairs of Gilgit-Baltistan in the corridors of bureaucratic and military power structures of Pakistan, in the initial and most important stages of the independence, as the British top ranking officials were retained. He was instrumental in the ill-definition of the constitutional position of Gilgit-Baltistan by inking these areas with NWFP and giving an impression to the Pakistani establishment that the freedom leaders of Gilgit-Baltistan wanted a complete independent sectarian State. The following excerpts from his book are worth noticing:-
In the chapter on ‘Return to Gilgit’, he writes, “All that Gilgit wanted was the peace and security afforded under the Pax Britannica, and the method by which this could have been continued, despite partition, would have been to have made the Gilgit Agency an Agency of the North-West Frontier Province, directly under H.E, the Governor. This would have ensured a continuity in administration, peace, security and unity, infertile ground for Soviet seed.” Again, “Gilgit Agency is really a part of the North West Frontier Province.” While briefing the newly arrived Pakistani Political Agent, he writes, “I would advise that you make immediate arrangements for a Pathan staff to be sent up from Peshawar. Five are required; an Assistant Political Agent, a Tehsildar, a Naib (Assistant) Tehsildar, a Treasury Clerk, and a Personal Assistant. That is a sufficient number of neutral outsiders and with them you’ll soon have your administration functioning like clockwork.”
While pondering on the situation, he writes, “As the first light of dawn cast grey streaks across the floor, we appreciated and reached conclusions on the political situation. The Gilgit Agency was not nearly ready for self-government, and the continuance of the present so-called Provisional Government would only lead to anarchy in a violent outburst of faction-feeling. If peace and tranquility were to be maintained, an alien dictator must assume compete power, a dictator such as the Political Agent was before Partition.”
Though, in his initial reports he has praised the first President of the Islamic Republic of Gilgit-Baltistan, Raja Shah Rais Khan; but on the arrival of the first Pakistan Political Agent , who has happened to land a little before expected reception, he humiliates him in these words, “We turned and what looked like the charge of the light Brigade breasted the brow of the road. In the lead was Shah Rais Khan. His horse completely out of control, he had thrown the reins to the wind, and was hanging on the pommel of the saddle with both hands for all he was worth. Who on earth’s that fellow in front? A Cossack trick-rider? asked Mohammad Alam. That is the Nawab of Gilgit, I replied. I think it was these few words which cemented an invaluable friendship between us. I saw he had a keen sense of humor after my own heart. We both laughed till the tears ran down our faces.”
The Residency of the Governor House in Gilgit has always remained a symbol of alien bureaucratic slavish rule. After the surrender of Governor Brown again ensured slavery of the people of North. He mentions, “We did not know Political Agent Mohammad Alam, but it was befitting and most necessary that the Pakistan representative should stay in Agency House. We also thought that there was every possibility that Colonel Bacon might be accompanying him – in fact the the current rumor in the Agency was that Colonel Bacon was returning as Political Agent.”
Brown has taken great pains in downplaying and erroneous labeling of the members and leaders of the revolution and provisional Government which had a direct bearing on the undefined constitutional status of Gilgit-Baltistan. Worth noting in this regard are his following statements:-
In the context of the formation of provisional Govt. just after the surrender of Governor Ghansara, he writes, “It was now becoming increasingly obvious that there was a good deal more going on than Pakistan proclivities, and the somewhat dubious situation was clarified to me some ten minutes later in a most interesting manner. I found quite a gathering of the cans in the sitting room. All rose to their feet and saluted. I motioned them to sit down and took stock; Baber, Shah Rais Khan, Mirza Hassan, Shah Sultan, and Jan Alam (eventually returned from retirement), representing the Shiah contingent, sat together. On the far side sat Shah Khan, Fida Ali (a Hunzawal but a Shiah), Jamedar Shah Zaman of Punial (just returned from leave). Police Inspector Hamid of Punial, and Jamedar Akbar Hussain, who commanded the Gilgit platoon.” On another occasion, he writes, “At every move, I was thwarting Mirza Hassan and his satellites from their dream of a united State of Gilgit. If I could be disposed of, however, they would be free to pursue their nefarious plans. So the first thing I did was to organize a strong Scout bodyguard for myself, of chosen men from different tribes on whom I placed full confidence.” After hoisting of Pakistan flag in a ceremony, he accuses Hassan, “I breathed a sigh of relief. A very definite step had now been taken against Mirza Hassan and the gang. Let him dare to remove the Pakistan fag and replace it with that of his United States.” Brown’s misrepresentation of the aims of provisional Govt can be gauged from the attributed wordings of Captain Saeed Durrani (a non-local), “And now,” continued Said, “We have decided to form a Provisional Government to rule the Gilgit Agency. The word of the Government will be law, and if a representative of the Pakistan Government does arrive he will be allowed no hand in dictating policy, but will be treated as a mere observer.”
He, throughout his tenure, gave a wrong impression to the government of Pakistan as is obvious from, “The ambitious in Gilgit were now preparing for the inevitable scramble for power which would result if Pakistan did not decide to interfere. Political factions, religious factions, blood factions, and tribal factions were gathering their forces and panning their campaign of action.” Again, “On 9 November, I dispatched a wireless message to Colonel Bacon, the only person in Pakistan at the time who could really appreciate the situation. Doing utmost to keep situation under control but cannot do so indefinitely owing successive internal intrigue – stop – imperative representative from Pakistan arrive immediately – stop – moral effect of even short visit would reassure population.” About Hassan Khan’s reappearance on the political scene of Gilgit after Pakistani Political Agent’s arrival he writes, “After lunch, the provisional Government appeared on the scene, led by Mirza Hassan and Said. Mohammad Alam granted them an interview. It transpired that Mirza Hassan had arrived in Gilgit the previous evening from Bunji. He had immediately called a meeting of the Provisional Government. He pointed out to the members that the powerful duo of Mohammad Alam and Brown, working in close cooperation, spelt the doom of the Provisional Government and all their aspirations towards absolute power in the independent United States of Gilgit. They would inform him that although he was the Pakistan Representative, it was the Provisional Government which held absolute power in Gilgit. He must therefore make no decision without first receiving their approval, and that he further must obey their orders in all matters. Their first order was that Major Brown must be instantly relieved from his appointment of Commandant Scouts.”
Question arises about the legal and official capacity in which Major Brown was being entertained as a sole representative of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan by the Pakistani establishment, especially in wake of the presence of bona fide provisional Govt of the Islamic Republic of Gilgit-Baltistan. The following is worth noticing in this regard:-
“I duly delivered the Instrument of Accession of Hunza and Nagir to Lt Colonel A J Dring CIE, Chief Secretary to the Government of the North West Frontier Province.”
About his encounter with Sikandar Mirza, the Defence Secretary, he writes, “The Defence Secretary became ardently enthusiastic and I knew I had won him over to my point of view. When I finished he said, “The best thing Roger, is for you to bring Brown down to the Prime Minister’s Conference at Rawalpindi at the beginning of December, Liaqat Ali, the Pakistan Premier will be there, and I shall brief him regarding the situation in Gilgit beforehand. You too can then fill in the details and advise him as to the best course of action.” In the same context, “We were introduced to the various Secretaries and Assistants who had accompanied the Pakistan Premier, to Khan Iftikhar Hussain Khan, Khan of Mamdot, Premier of the West Punjab, and to Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim, President of the Free Kashmir Government. I had a long and interesting talk with each and I was particularly struck by their patriotism for Pakistan. Pakistan and the Quaid-I-Azam were everything to them; I could detect no faction feeling or disagreement, and I became certain that if this state of complete unity continued, the prospects of the future prosperity of the Dominion were indeed bright.”
REVOLUTION FOR INDEPENDENCE AT GILGIT
(1ST NOVEMBER 1947)
AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS
BACKGROUND
Correct Perspective:
The breathtaking traumatic events of 1947, happening in a milieu of peculiar Machiavellian conspiracies of Gilgit Game; culminated into a pure military revolt in Gigit on 1 November 1947; thereby giving birth to a revolutionary era, wherein the English and Dogra Yoke of slavery was dispensed with. A wholesome, coherent and realistic view of these events is necessary to gauge minutely, as to what has really happened, especially in wake of labyrinthed portrayal of cascade of lies and tangled web of events. It assumes added importance, keeping in view the fact that almost all the luminaries of those incredible events have made written statements, which are available now and there can be no denying the fact that this unique feat of the history of creation of Pakistan has been hijacked by the very elements like the then Commandant Gilgit Scouts Major Brown , who in fact had worked against it. In the absence of an authentic historic account; we are gullible to fall for Indian and British versions hook, line and sinker. We should be wary of the Indian version to prove that Pakistan is a creation of British. This sensational revolt triggered a long drawn war, at the peak of which in May 1948 – 63000 out of a total 84000 square miles area of the Kashmir State was liberated.
TURMOIL IN THE STATE ARMY:
The settings of this revolt can be traced back to the year 1935 of the “Great Game Era” , when Maharaja Hari Singh withdrew his own administrative machinery and handed over Gilgit Agency to the British on a sixty year lease due to persistent British interest. This was followed by the outbreak of Second World War. Two Battalions of Jammu and Kashmir State Forces i.e, 2 and 4 J&K participated in this war in a big way. Captain Hassan Khan and Captain Aslam of 4 J&K, considered to be the crackest unit of the State Forces, were promoted as Major together on 3 November 1943. During this period Hassan Khan along with other Muslim officers met Quaid-e-Azam in Bombay and sought his guidance. Who prophetically advised that the interest which has brought them to him will guide them further. After Second World War, the Muslim elements of J&K Troops reached back Satwari Cantonment, Jammu from overseas in January 1946; to find themselves in an atmosphere of changed attitudes, religious state of Jammu and Kashmir in general and that of its Muslim population in particular was in doldrums, due to impending partition of the subcontinent. The Muslim officers of the State Forces got together and hatched a Secret Military Council , headed by Major Hassan and initially consisted of Major Afzal Shaheed, Major Mohammad Din, Major Rehmat Ullah, Major Sher, Major Ghazanfar Ali Shah, Major Feroz Din and Captain Mansha. Major Asam (Shangrila fame) was cultivated with difficulties. Gradually with hard work, some other Muslim officers were also included. The indoctrination was amazingly welcome by majority of the Muslim Junior Commissioned officers and other ranks. According to Colonel (late) Mansha Khan, the over-clever type were not included. Though there were some reasonably senior serving Muslim officers, but they were not confided due to their slavish mentality. Brigadier Ghansara Singh Jammuwal, the last Dogra Governor of the Northern Kashmir Province of Gilgit-Baltistan; very clearly mentions in his memoir “Gilgit Before 1947” that it was in the knowledge of General Headquarters Srinagar that Hassan had started work for Pakistan in Srinagar. It is pertinent to note that the only three and a half of Muslim J&K Regiment of the State Forces were instrumental in determining the course of War of Liberation. The hard worked out strategy for toppling Dogra regime, in case of its accession with India got s jolt, when opportunist Major Aslam got himself quietly posted to undivided Indian Army at Ranchi to reap promotion benefit and thus left Jammu; his task and his native town unattended. Major Afzal Shaheed was in Nowshera and Hassan Khan was successful in getting himself posted to an independent Company of 6 J&K at Srinagar, Badami Bagh Cantonment in July 1947. As the secrecy of the Military Council was leaking out, therefore they were eager for a prompt action but were hindered by the Stand Still Agreement between Quaid-e-Azam and Maharaja Hari Singh. Major General D.K Palit VrC in his book on official history of the J&K Rifles writes, “There was a pot in the offing to subvert the Muslim elements of J&K. In these troubled time some among the Muslim officers continued to tender loyal service, but there were many who had begun to plan acts of treachery and betrayal that were to deal a crippling blow to the defence of the State.” Furthermore, Major then Lieutenant Colonel Rehmat Ullah Khan in his report of 25 April 1948 and 3 June 1952, respectively on “Rajauri Operations” writes, In 1947, out of the 15000 strength of the State Forces, only about 1500 were Muslims, Most of whom were in the 2nd, 4th and 6th Kashmir Rifles, where they formed 50% of the strength. These units were stationed in Nowshera, Muzaffarabad and Gilgit respectively. Since 1940, the Dogra Ruler who was himself the C-in-C of the State Forces, hd been following a policy of open discrimination against the Muslim troops. Recruitment of Muslims had been stopped and the senior Muslim officers were being superseded. Muslim troops were therefore disgruntled. All of them were, moreover, pro Pakistan and expected the state to form part of it. Some Muslim officers of the Dogra Army had long been in league with each other to rebel against Dogra Raj in the State when the British withdrew. In 1947, these officers were scattered in the State, in Nowshera, Muzaffarabad, Gilgit etc. Thus when the Dogra started a planned mass massacre of the unarmed Muslim population of the Jammu province, and the Maharaja decided to accede to India, these troops rose in revolt and a widespread and spontaneous uprising took place in the Mirpur, Muzaffarabad and Gilgit areas.” At this juncture, all important Mirs and Rajas of Gilgit-Batistan were summoned to Srinagar and they vowed their allegiance to Maharaja Kashmir. August was a month of mounting tension in the State and as a result of leaked out secrecy of the Secret Military Council, Hassan Khan along with his D Company was posted out forthwith to Bunji , in order to relieve a company of 5 J&K of Captain Durga Singh. It is to be observed that initially the intention was only to dispose off a troublesome field officer in a remote corner and the rest 6 J&K Battalion stationed at Nowshera was not to be rushed to Gilgit-Batistan; especially in the wake of the troubled state of affairs of the State and the fact that out of a total of nine Battalions of the State Army, almost one Battalion was already looking after the peaceful Northern Regions. It is worth mentioning that at this stage, there were hectic movements of the State troops to and fro.
SCOPE:
An effort has been made to logically explain the planning and execution of the first phase of the war of liberation for Gigit-Baltistan i.e the revolution at Gilgit by taking into account all available material. Luckily, written statements of all the leading characters of this highly sensational revolt of , including those of treacherous conspirators are now available. It has been tried to establish the link between different chain of events both during planning and execution of the revolt phase in a chronological manner.
COMPARISON OF FORCES
Consult the Appendix
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE PLANNING AND REVOLT OF 1 NOVEMBER 1947 AND SUBSEQUENT FALL OF BUNJI GARRISON
REAL ENGLISH DESIGNS FOR GILGIT-BATISTAN
The last English Viceroy of Subcontinent , on 1st Lord Mountbatten was a supreme manipulator. On his orders on 1st August 1947; a little before partition, the hard-earned Gilgit Agency was handed over to the Dogra regime. At this critical time, Quaid-e-Azam was having Standstill Agreement with Maharaja Hari Singh. Brig Ghansara Singh alongwith Chief of General Staff of the State Army Genera Scott and Captain Saeed Durrani arrived in Gilgit on 30 July 1947 and took over charge of the Agency as Governor from Lieutenant Colonel Beacon, the English Political Agent. On behalf of Scouts, Major Brown presented their customary demands of pay-raise proportional to that of State Forces. The services of the two British officers with the Scouts i.e Major Brown and Captain Mathieson, was willingly retained in the State Army, on their own consent and thus in accordance with the rules/regulations, they were directly responsible to Governor. As per a briefing report of Major Brown, he used to daily present the facts before Governor. During beginning August, there was an infighting among various local Mirs/Rajas; including Mehtar Chitral over the State of Yasin. It should be specifically noted that after the partition of the Subcontinent, Lord Mountbatten was the Governor General Bharat and Quaid-e-Azam was the Governor General of Pakistan; who refused to accept him as the common Governor. It was from this position that Mountbatten ordered entry of Indian Army into Kashmir.
STORMY MOVE AND BELLING OF THE CAT
Major Hassan's D Company started movement from Srinagar for Bunji on 1 September 1947. While leaving Srinagar, the motivated Company started raising pro-Pakistan slogans. Brig Ghansara Singh, Governor of Gilgit writes, “Leading Company of 6 J&K started raising pro-Pakistan slogans in Bandipura. People of Gurez and Astore reported this to me and asked to stop them. I promptly reported the issue to Major Genera Scott and Brig Rajinder Singh. In reply, Scott intimated that State Police has also confirmed the complaint of locals through a responsible officer. He further directed that necessary disciplinary action should be taken against culprits. They should be arrested and send to Srinagar under escort. The same was also reported in writing by Revenue Assistant Raja Noor Ali Khan from Astore. On arrival of Commanding Officer of 6th J&K, Lt Col Abdul Majeed in Bunji, I briefed him about the situation and ordered for necessary action.” While on the move, Hassan Khan received a message of Major General Scott to immediately report back, which was ignored. Now realizing the stance of the revolted company, Force available to neutralize it and seriousness of the situation, 6th J&K stationed at Nowshera was immediately rushed to Srinagar and then directed towards Bunji. Hassan Khan comfortably reached Bunji on 10 September 1947 and peacefully relieved Captain Durgha Sing’s eager to eave, 5th J&K Company. Now, Hassan had no other option at this stage except rallying support of Gilgit Scout elements. The first to be indoctrinated through elements 6 J&K was Subedar Jan Alam of Scouts at Chilas. Shorty afterwards, Captain Nek Aam arrived with another company of 6 J&K. Hassan Khan, assessing his pro- Ghandi ideas, got him transferred to Skardu through through his connections. The Second in Command of Gilgit Scouts, Captain Saeed Durrani mentions that Major Hassan Khan, while on a trout fishing in Kargah Nullah in the vicinity of Gilgit, took oath of allegiance on Quran from him. He further states that later on, the oath of the secret Military Council on Quran for toppling Dogra regime was also taken by Captain Mohammad Khan, Lieutenant Haider and Subedar Major Babar Khan. Baber Khan submitted a written oath of allegiance from responsible personnel of Scouts. Captain Saeed Durrani was acting as Deputy of the Military Revolutionary Council , headed by Hassan Khan, whose orders were to be obeyed at all cost. It is important to note that at this point of time, Maharaja Hari Singh had not declared the independence or accession status of the State of Kashmir. Captain Muhammad Khan Jaral and Major Ehsan Ali have also written that Baber Khan was taken into confidence by Hassan for the cause of Pakistan. Brig Ghansara Singh terms this situation as alarming in the wake of continuing liaison between Muslim officers of Gilgit Scouts and J&K Regiment at Bunji. Two Gilgiti brothers Zawar Muhammad Ali and Amir Jehandar Shah use to relay messages between Gilgit and Bunji for the Revolutionary Council. Shortly afterwards, 6 J&K Battalion under their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Majid arrived at Bunji. Hassan Khan immediately cultivated al the Muslim elements of the Regiment and very successfully knitted a close web around his Commanding Officer; thereby he use to remain abreast with what al was transpiring between his commanding officer and the Governor about his arrest. The first President of the interim Government of the Republic of Gigit-Batistan, Raja Shah Rais Khan, whose was initially an employee of the Governor secretariat writes that in his presence Lieutenant Colonel Majeed complained against Hassan to Governor, who was of the opinion that he should be shot. In connection with the birthday celebrations of Maharaja Hari Singh, a political function/Jalsa was organized at Gilgit with the intention of arresting Hassan. Commanding officer 6 J&K with a Sikh Company and Major Hassan were ordered to attend. He foiled the attempt by participating along with his fully armed Muslim Company. Governor mentions that through informers, he came to know that during this function, Muslim officers of Bunji and Gilgit conspired. Major Brown has recorded that Governor and Commanding Officer 6 J&K got the order of sending Hassan under arrest to Srinagar annulled, for fear of aggravation of an already serious situation.
DAUNTLESS PLANNING AND OVERPOWERING INTRIGUES
Major Hassan Khan (MC) was of the opinion that Major Brown’s policies were in conformity with General Graccy’s policies and his services were rendered by Maharaja Kashmir for the same purpose. There were news in the air that India was about to station a brigade in the region. The civil population in Gilgit, much before time was considering Hassan Khan as the ring-leader. It is mentioned in black and white in Major Brown’s report that Major Brown and Captain Mathieson soon realized that an underground movement in the troops was at work, the members of an the actual power of which could not be ascertained. Furthermore, Brown use to daily present the facts before Governor. Captain Saeed says that a little before revolt, he sensed that Brown has got an inkling of their secret activities and was instigating Governor against him. Resultantly, he was posted to Misgar/Kalamdarchi Fort near Chinese border. Major Brown was now up to scattering the suspected key personne, Captain Muhammad Khan Jaral was posted to Bunji, Subedar Jan Alam was dismissed, Subedar Major Baber Khan was mosty kept on patrolling, he was about to be discharged and use to bitterly crib against Brown with Hassan. On the other hand, Lieutenant Haider and Naib Subedar Shah Khan were having a good opinion of Brown uptill now. Lieutenant Haider mentions that code names were allotted to key personnel, fortunately some letters of those days with code names have been printed in certain books. On 28 October 1947, Maharaja Kashmir announced expected accession with India. Hassan at Bunji came to know of it early in the morning of 31 October 1947. He immediately established contact with Lieutenant Haider and Subedar Major Baber Khan at Gilgit. It was mutually decided and agreed that on the night of 31 October, at midnight Hassan will attack Sikh/Dogra elements in Bunji, for which they will come to his help after arresting the Governor. At 1200 hour on 31 October, again Haider and Baber rang up Hassan with a perplexed mind and informed him that now there is no requirement of undertaking any action; as Brown has assured them that within two to three days, Governor will ensure declaration of accession of these areas with Pakistan by Maharaja Kashmir. This displayed the treacherous nature Brown and his ability to cleverly win confidence of Hassan’s colleagues. Hassan got infuriated on this and explained to them that after Maharaja’s decision, he is left with no authority to do this and explained to them the dire consequences of an inaction. After sometime, they again rang up and promised to act in the evening; as they had realized the truth. It is interesting to note that the old man in the Governor House was listening to all what was being communicated. He, at this moment used his last but well thought-out trump card. He himself writes, “In the wake of the protection request of Hindus, I had to choose between Gilgit Scouts and State Forces. Keeping in mind Punjab and Poonch disturbances, State Force was more harmful to us. I avoided them till the last. I ordered Lieutenant Colonel Abdu Majeed to reach Gilgit with maximum possible force as soon as possible.” Major Genera D.K Palit, Vr C in his book on official version of the “History of the J&K Rifles” depicts this juncture in these words, “Ghansara being dubious of the loyalty of the Muslim Company of 6 J&K at Bunji, opted to rely solely on the Scouts for the defence of Gigit.”
The wickedness of Brown can be gauged from the fact that on 27 October, anticipating known accession decision or on 28 October; after knowing decision, gave orders to Scouts at Chilas, headed by Captain Matheison to advance and surround Bunji by burning the two important bridges of Ramghat and Partab; thereby completely isolating Bunji. This was done so that as advised by Major Brown, The Sikh Company to be asked by the Governor in Gilgit is capable of controlling area North of Indus and Hassan Khan, the defector is sorted out in Bunji. Subedar Taighoon Shah of Scouts admits receiving instructions to snipe Hassan’s positions in Bunji on that very night, he was attack Sikhs there. Hassan Khan in his memoir mentions, “If going of Sikhs to Gilgit would have happened, may would have joined them and Scouts would have disintegrated.” At about noon time on 31 October 1947, the head clerk of the Battalion , Captain (Honorary) Ghulab Din informed Hassan that Captain Baldev Singh’s Sikh Company is being dispatched to Gilgit. Hassan Khan duly alarmed went to the Commanding Officer armed and bluntly told him to send him alongwith his Muslim Company to Gilgit instead of Sikhs, otherwise he should be ready for a battle in Bunji, then and there. Lieutenant Colonel Majeed consented and Hassan Khan after briefing the remaining Muslim elements about the strategy for coming days, left Gilgit alongwith his outfit, a little before dusk time. Now indeed, the fate of Gilgit-Baltistan hung by a slender thread.
FROM THE SLAVE DUSK OF 31 OCTOBER TO THE FREEDOM DAWN OF 1 NOVEMBER 1947
Lieutenant Haider, after consulting his diary of those turbulent moments, writes of the events of Night 31 Oct-1 November 1947 in these words, “30 men with Subedar Major to Governor’s place to arrest him – Post and telegraph offices taken over by me. I went to Governor House and burst fire Medium Machine Gun (Brig Ghansara Singh recapitulates those moments in these words Yes it was Lieutenant Haider; son of Lieutenant Colonel Sher Ali (Redt) of 6th J&K Infantry, earning pension from State, who was firing on me – 30 Men and Medium Machine Gun to Bhup Singh Pari to block route from Bunji – Governor is holding out and night passes like that, during night a message that Hasan has reached Parri, a relief – Dawn of 1 November and the Governor has not surrendered - Hassan arrives Gigit – Hassan and myself move down – Green Light goes up at Governor’s residence as arranged to signal his surrender.” Naib Subedar Shah Khan (Group Captain later) also confirms that Lieutenant Haider the Agency (Governor) House to arrest Brig Ghansara. Baber Khan has also claimed in writing that he arrested Major Brown before moving up to arrest Ghansara and that he was having two Junior Commissioned Officers with him i.e, Subedar Shah Sultan and Subedar Safiulah for this purpose.
On the other hand, the Muslim Company of J&K came across Zawar Muhammad Ali, the messenger at Parri Bangla, who apprised them of the situation in Gilgit. He was given a message for Lieutenant Haider by the Company Commander Major Hassan Khan to send a fake message from Governor to Bunji for Lieutenant Colonel Majeed and Major Ehsan Ali to immediately come to Gilgit for an emergent meeting. The prime motive was that these two Muslim officers should not be influential on the leftover Muslim elements of J&K Regiment in Bunji during Hassan’s absence. He was further instructed that after passing this message, no other information whatsoever should be allowed to be passed to Bunji. Hassan Khan came across Subedar Safiulah Beg’s persons at the start of village Minawar after an exchange of pro-Pakistan slogans. A capable military commander always takes into account various ifs and buts. Subedar Safiulah was also briefed to arrest Lieutenant Colonel Majeed and Ehsan Ali on their way to Gigit for a supposedly emergent meeting with Governor. Thereafter, Hassan Khan along with his Burma war companion orderly Farman Ali (still alive), galloped towards Gilgit. From now onwards the events have been misconstrued and highly misrepresented for innumerable motives. Therefore, there is a need of grasping numerous versions simultaneously in a gradual manner. Besides, it is equally important to gauge the motive of Governor Ghansara for holding out throughout the night along with only two orderlies, despite very heavy odds. In this skirmish, Scouts had two casualties.
Hassan arrived at Gigit just at dawn time and went straight to Scouts Lines where he came across some Junior Commissioned Officers including Shah Sultan, Sultan Feroz, Shah Khan, Fida Ali but was not able to trace Haider and Baber. On inquiry, he was told that they were holding meetings with Brown in the Officers’ Mess. Over there he found them demoralized and after narrating the events of the night, they proposed to burn the Governor’s Bungalow. At this juncture let us analyze the different versions. Governor writes,
Next morning Tehsildar Pandit Mani Ram alongwith a Police Inspector came and said that officers’ are asking to lay down arms wihin fifteen minutes. I called Revenue Assistant Astore, Raja Noor Ali Khan and Tehsildar Sehdev Singh. After discussing the situation with them and getting information about the arrival of Colonel Abdul Majeed, of whom I was anxiously waiting to turn the tide and instead of knowing that Captain Hassan Khan has arrived, after deploying his Company in Parri, at 0900 hours, I decided to agree to their conditions.
Subedar Major Baber Khan mentions that
Governor came out in the morning – I had sent Naib Tehsildar Mani Ram to Governor – I took him to Scouts Lines.
Subedar Shah Sultan highlights this event by saying,
Governor was not arrested till morning. Nobody was able to arrest the Governor. Major Hassan Khan selected me. I physically arrested the Governor by taking cover of Naib Tehsildar Mani Ram.
Hassan Khan further mentions that
At 0900 hours, I called Raja Noor Ali and Governor’s PA Sehdev Singh. Through them, I sent a written message to Governor assuring him of security and honor of his life. He was conveyed that instead of Sikhs, I have arrived. Immediately white buntings were raised from both sides. Subedar Shah Sultan arrested the Governor.
Now following should be crystal clear. Governor was resisting in wait for the Sikh troops to arrive. Lt Haider/Baber sent a message through Mani Ram but to no avail, Ghansara gave up once he came to know through Raja Noor Ali and Sehdev Singh that instead of Sikhs, Hassan has arrived. Shah Sultan physically arrested him inside the Bungalow and Baber Khan escorted him to the Scouts ines. The picture becomes clear, wholesome and without any contradictions, once the various statements are taken together in their entirety.
After this happening, people started gathering in Shahi Polo ground. Hassan Khan addressed them and after announcement of the Islamic Republic of Gilgit-Baltistan, he assured the non-Muslims present there of security of their honour and lives. An interim government was set up in a meeting held in Scouts Lines and Hassan Khan was declared leader of the Revolutionary Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Army. A Raja of Gilgit, Shah Rais Khan was appointed as the President and Haider took over as the Civil Administrator. In this meeting a signal message by Hassan Khan was dictated to Lieutenant Haider for asking a Pakistan representative to help them in administration. This is verified in a secret report of 4 Mar 1949 sent by Government of Pakistan, Secretariat of the Minister without portfolio to Lieutenant Colonel Iskandar Mirza, Defence Secretary, Govt of Pakistan, Karachi; stating in para 9
About the beginning of October 1947, there was some local disturbance due to a clash between the Muslim and Sikh elements in the Kashmir State Forces. The tension was accentuated by the sudden announcement of the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union. There was an almost bloodless revolution and early in November, a local provisional Government was set up, which invited the Pakistan Government to take it over.
The English officer Major Brown on behest of Hassan’s colleagues also attended the said meeting and were appointed as his military advisors. On the appointment of the President of the newly formed Republic, a row erupted between Hassan, who pointed a pistol at the English officer. This English officer was arrested on the order of Hassan Khan after the meeting. Lieutenant Haider’s diary of that period states,
Brown arrested by Hassan on 1 November, but released on my insistence. He remained ineffective till Muslim officers ruled Gilgit, but started showing his colors once Pakistan Political Agent Sardar Alam came into the arena. He was a cunning person, who was able to convince the new administration about his vita role in the liberation of Gilgit, impress the local rulers of his importance and ensured ouster of Muslim officers.
His diary further states,
Major Brown was a dirty fish – my mistakes – at the start of revolt I had good opinion about him. He had given a false impressions in Pakistan. Cunning Brown thinks of me to be an obstruction in his way. I told Khan Qayyum, Chief Minister of NWFP about him.” It is an eye-opener to know what Major Brown has given out in his debriefing report to an English C-in-C of Pakistan Army, endeavoring to tarnish the image of Hassan Khan, “The movement was headed by Hassan Khan to form an independent State and to kill all non-Muslims. To oppose the wishes of this party on 1 November would have been suicidal. Major Brown, therefore, accepted the situation and helped to maintain law and order and advised all to avoid any resort to violence. Major Brown pointed out the futility of attempting to form an independent state that affiliation to Pakistan was the only way to ensure safety and security.
In actual fact the smokescreen for accrediting English officers for toppling Dogra regime and their role in the creation of Pakistan serves the purpose of Indians as well as English. The first Pakistani Political Agent Sardar Alam sums up those events in these words communicated to a Joint Secretary,
In my official capacity – Hassan was the moving spirit in a plot to overthrow Dogra rue. He defeated and captured all the Sikh and Dogra troops. He assisted by two other officers of Scouts, put the Governor under arrest and took over the administration of the Agency. He was practically head of the administration till Pakistan took over. The Pakistan Government was invited by them to take over.
Another surprise in this unbelievable adventure is added by Major Aslam Khan of J&K (later Brig Aslam of Shangrilla fame) who betrayed Muslim officers’ cause of liberating whole of Kashmir by abandoning Jammu. He writes in his handing over notes to Major General Jillani; on packing off as Military Representative/Commander of Pakistan Army in Gilgit-Baltistan, after suffering severe reverses,
Hassan hatched plans with Scouts for taking over control of this area from the Dogras and got himself recognized as Military dictator of Gigit. He set up a cabinet of local riff-raffs. The ‘Cabinet’ found it difficult to work smoothly and Pakistan Government was requested to send their representative. Fortunately, Gilgit Treasury was still found intact. The cabinet was dissolved, Major Brown and Captain Mathieson, who had been arrested released, against arrested by the cabinet were put incharge of the Scouts and Captain Hassan Khan – who by this time had assumed the rank of Major General was sent to command the Bunji-Astore area; with the rank of Mountain Marshal.
He has written like this in conformity with the wishes of his English bosses of Pakistan Army. He was instrumental in taking Hassan Khan off from the command of Tiger Force when in the vicinity of Bandipura and Wular Lake of Srinagar valley, to a worthless ISSB Kohat test for induction into Pakistan Army. At a later critical stage as Personal Secretary to General Tariq C-in-C of Azad Forces, he shamelessly writes to Colonel Jillani as a consequence of reverses,“Hassan has finished his interview with the selection board and although for reasons that you and the PA know, I did not consider his presence desirable in the Scouts at that time, in the present emergency, he may be useful, as desired, he is being sent to report to you.
His successor Colonel/Brigadier Jillani of the Indian National Army has also made interesting observations about the events of 1 November 1947,
The local Mirs, Rajas considered the whole thing foolish, local nonentity proclaimed the head of independent Gilgit Republic, with real power in the hands of Military. One of the Marshals put some people under arrest including some military officers who were senior to him and threatened Mirs etc., with dire consequences unless they submitted to the new Government.
On 2 November, Colonel Majeed and Major Ehsan Ali started for Gilgit as per the fake message and by noon were arrested at Bhup Sing Pari. Ehsan Ali writes, “Hassan become a self-styled Genera, as he was junior to Commanding Officer and me, ordered our arrest saying that we were from Dogras.”
ASSAULT ACROSS FROM RIVER INDUS AND FALL OF BUNJI GARRISON
The success at Gilgit for the longevity of the Revolution was meaningless unless the Sikhs/Dogra power concentrated at Bunji was neutralized. Hassan Khan being the only war veteran officer had no time at his disposal to deal with the conspiracies at Gilgit. In Bunji, it was important to achieve success in the first attempt, otherwise the enemy over there was capable of holding out and could have established line of communication with Srinagar and Baltistan for obtaining reinforcements. Hassan advanced towards Bunji on 2 November 1947, with five Platoons of Gilgit Scouts and Rife Company of J&K at 1700 hours. The attack across Indus on a raft was conducted on 4 November, when the Sikhs and Muslim elements in Bunji were about to clash. Hassan Khan was in the leading raft and with his arrival on far bank, the Sikh/Dogras fled. It was a unique and spectacular act. Hassan sarcastically writes that in the evening of the same day, his colleagues of Gilgit along with Brown came to congratulate him.
EPILOGUE
Before the seizure of the initiative of these selfless, dedicated, and true Muslim leaders or in other words, before the arrival of Major Aslam/Colonel Pasha (assumed name) as Pakistan Army representative, all the fleeing Sikh/Dogras had been captured, huge merchandise for winters on the sizeable animal caravan was seized in Traghbal-Gurez Valley and entry into Baltistan was made. Major Genera Palit mentions,
“Captain Nek Alam of C Company had intercepted and forwarded to Army Headquarters, Srinagar, two letters from Captain Hassan Khan (a defector, it will be remembered, in Gilgit) urging the Muslim troops at Skardu to take and hold the Garrison until the arrival of support from Gilgit.”
The subsequent events were unique and involved astounding human qualities at work against each other on the internal as well as external fronts. The long-drawn fourteen months war of liberation for Kashmir ended with many frustrations for die-heart Kashmir fan Muslim officers of Pakistan Army. They believed that each day of ceasefire in Kashmir as per British designs helped consolidate the Indian position while undermining that of Pakistan. Such like-minded officers including Hassan were nabbed together in a so-called Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case and their record in Kashmir was tampered with. The linchpin of the entire tragedy is the fact that Pakistan retained British Generals in the highest command of its Armed Forces during the first and most vulnerable three years of its inception. The Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case epitomized this conflict of interest. It was not until Gen Gracey and the rest of the British high Command was to depart from South Asia that Ayub, Sikandar, and Liaqat were briefed by Gracey regarding
Men in the Army who held recalcitrant views.
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APPENDIX |
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COMPARISON OF OPPOSING
FORCES |
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|
FORCE |
STRENGTH / COMPOSITION |
DISPOSITION |
ROLE |
COMBAT WORTHINESS |
COMMANDERS |
OWN/ ENEMY |
REMARKS |
|
Gilgit Scouts |
582 Consisting of platoons from several small stales. All Muslims. These Platoons were significantly under the influence of local Mirs/Rajas. |
300 at Gilgit. Rest Misgar, Chilas and Ghizer |
It was a political force. Its commandant was responsible to Political Agent and latter to Governor. Its responsibility was to maintain internal law and order like police. |
Only well versed in patrolling and climbing at that stage. |
Major Brown was the Commandant. Captain Saeed of J & K originally came to
take over but after hiring on contract of Major Brown and Captain Matheison
by the Dogra regime, he was appointed Second in Command. Lieutenant Haider
of J & K was acting as Adjutant Captain Mulumunad Khan Jaral was
Quartremaster. Subedar Major was Babar Khan. Naib Subedar Shah Khan was
Jemadar to Adjutant and in the Platoon of Subedar Saifullah. |
95% own 5% enemy |
Sensing the impending revolt
in the offing,Major Brown got Captain Saeed posted to Misgar, Captain
Mohammad Khan to Bunji in 6 J ft K and as per Major Ehsan Ali as well as
Hassan, dismissed senior most Subedar Jan Alam and use to mostly keep Babar
on patrolling,. Babar Khan used Io often complain about the nostalgic attitude
of Brown to Major Hassan. . |
|
Raja Punial Body Guard |
Few individuals probably 15 to 30 |
Punial |
Personal Job of Raja |
Very Less |
Raja Punial, a trusted aide
of Maharaja |
|
|
|
Brigadier Gharsara with his two orderlies |
3 |
Gilgit |
|
Fully trained Soldiers |
|
100% enemy
|
|
|
6 J&K Infantry Battalion |
Sikhs- 600, Dogras – 100, Muslims- 400 A and B companies - All Sikh officers and Jawans. C&D companies – Jawans Muslims but all officers except Major Hassan Sikhs.
HQ Company – Mix, MG and
Mor Platoons, Muslim And Compnay - Sikhs/Dogras Reinforcement Company -
Sikhs/Dogras. |
Initially complete Battalion at Bunji. Later only three to four Platoons moved to Baltistan and Ladakh |
It was responsible for the security of the Northern regions for Kashmir state.Initially D Company of it was moved from Srinagar. Latter rest of 6 J &K was rushed from Noushera to Srinagar and then Bunji to rest the revolted D Company |
A highly combat worthy war
tested unit with the mission to tight in any weather and terrain at any time.
The Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel
Abdul Majeed was a highly capable
and professional officer, who was commanding since 1942. |
Lieutenant Colonel Majeed according
to Captain Saeed and Lieutenant Haider had no warmth for Pakistan and was
only interested in pensionary/service- benefits. Besides. among Muslim
Officers only Major Hassan Khan was significant, he had won over all Muslim
elements of the Regiment. Unfortunately Major Ehsan Alii arrived Bunji from
Srinagar on 29th October alongwith his
family and reported his arrival on 30 October, when he was appointed OC HQ Company. On the morning of this day a
D-Day and H-Hour to strike was decided. Maior Mohammad Khan himself admits to
be new in Bunji at the time of revolt and had little acquaintance with Muslim
troops. Lieutenant Nadir Ali was Deputy of Hassan in 6 J & K. |
36% own 64% enemy |
Major Nek Alam, who initially
was loyal to Dogra regime in a letter and Lieutenant Haider in his memoirs mentioned
that Hassan had won all the Muslim elements to the extent that Honorary
Captain Ghulab Din the head clerk of the Regiment and blue eyed of the
Commanding Officer sided with Hassan. |
|
Indian Brigadier |
3000-4000 |
Srinagar |
After Maharaja’s accession
decision of the State with India on 28 October 1947 and consequent induction
of Indian troops in Kashmir, there was a very strong possiblity of India
sending a Brigade in the region to control expected revolution. |
|
|
|
|
|
Tanzeem-e-Sarfaroshan |
Unknown – few notables who after success of the revolt declared its existence. |
Gilgit |
Moulding Public opinion |
Nil |
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